Eighteen definitions. No two agree.
A regulatory disagreement on what counts as AI is not a semantic squabble — it determines what gets licensed, what gets banned, what gets reported, what counts as 'AI investment' on an earnings call. The boundary work is the policy work.
Three broad families of definition. The regulatory family (EU AI Act, OECD, NIST, ISO/IEC 22989) converges on a behavioural definition: a machine-based system that infers outputs from objectives. Even within the family they differ on whether autonomy and adaptiveness are gating criteria — the difference between “is a regression model AI?” being yes or no.
The academic family (Russell & Norvig, McCarthy, Minsky) is broader still — Russell & Norvig's “rational agent” technically includes a thermostat as a trivially rational agent (the canonical AIMA example). McCarthy's 1955 Dartmouth proposal is even broader: “any feature of intelligence” that can be simulated.
The critical / sociotechnical family (Bender, Gebru, Crawford, AI Now) flips the frame: AI is not a discrete technology but an assemblage — models + data + labor + institutional deployment + downstream effects. From this angle, “what counts as AI” is itself a power claim about which technical systems get the prestige and the scrutiny of the label.
Same word. Seven artefacts. Ten definitions. No two columns agree.
The same loan-scoring regression is yes for NIST, partial for the EU, and no for the UK AI Security Institute. Below: the matrix that 'AI policy' is currently built on.
Tesler's effect: AI is whatever hasn't been done yet.
Chess, OCR, route-planning, spam filtering, search ranking — all called AI when invented; all demoted to 'just computation' once reliable. The current set (LLMs, diffusion, reasoning) hasn't been demoted yet.
Seven things, all called AI.
The figure below is the seven-tier model spectrum from LeResearch's philosophy page. Most public critique is about row 1 (frontier closed LLMs). Most useful AI work happens in rows 4–6 (small open models, classical ML, geostatistics). The marketing label covers all of it.
The model spectrum and the definitional spectrum are the same problem viewed from two angles. A blanket veto on “AI” passes as a considered position only because the row being objected to is left unnamed. The same is true of blanket enthusiasm. Part of what LeResearch exists to do is build the vocabulary that separates the mathematical method from the business model currently monetizing it.
The axes the public conversation routinely conflates.
Six axes of disagreement, six different fights pretending to be the same fight.
- 01
Scope: broad vs narrow.
EU AI Act covers any inferring system; China CAC covers only generative services; UK AISI covers only frontier models. The same announcement can be "AI policy" in three different senses.
- 02
Criterion: behavioural vs cognitive.
OECD and EU define AI by behaviour (it produces outputs). DeepMind and McCarthy define AI by cognition (it solves intelligence). The behavioural definitions are more enforceable; the cognitive ones are more aspirational.
- 03
Frame: technical artifact vs sociotechnical assemblage.
NIST/ISO treat AI as an engineered system to evaluate. Crawford and AI Now treat AI as the labor + data + deployment + harm chain. The same system gets different governance under each frame.
- 04
Capability: pattern matching vs emergent intelligence.
Bender ("stochastic parrots") and the OpenAI Charter ("highly autonomous systems that outperform humans") cannot both be right about the same models. Most policy is written as if both are.
- 05
Time-stability: fixed engineering definition vs moving target.
ISO 22989 wants a definition that holds for decades. Tesler's effect guarantees it won't. Any "future-proof" AI rule is making a bet against the AI effect.
- 06
Regulation gating: autonomy + adaptiveness required vs outputs alone sufficient.
EU AI Act requires both. NIST and ISO require neither. A regression model used to score loan applicants is in scope under one and out under the other.